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ARGUMENT
I.

THE STATUTORY TEXT, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, AND IN RE
KAPLAN DO NOT SUPPORT THE TRUSTEE'^ STRICT VIEW OF
THE EXEMPTION STATUTE
In his opening brief, the Trustee has attempted to refwrite the exemption

statute at issue, Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(l)(a)(x) (2000), by arguing that, in
order to be "described in" Section 401(a) of the tax code, & plan "must necessarily
be" operationally "qualified under" the tax code. Aplt. Br^ef at 12. The Trustee's
strict interpretation of the exemption statute is not supported by the statutory text,
legislative history, or the case of In re Kaplan, 162 B.R. 684, 697 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1993). Also, his strict interpretation runs afoul of this Court's historical policy of
construing exemption statutes "liberally . . . in favor of th$ debtor to protect him
and his family from hardship." In re Kunz, 2004 UT 71, f |8, 99 P.3d 793.
First, the Trustee's view is not supported by the statutory text. The
exemption statute states a retirement plan must be "described in"—and not
"qualified under"—Section 401(a) of the IRC in order totyeexempt. Utah Code
Ann. § 78-23-5(l)(a)(x) (2000). In fact, the exemption statute does not even use
the word "qualified." See id.
The crux of the Trustee's argument on this issue is that the headings of
Sections 401 and 401(a) of the IRC contain a variation of the word "qualified" in
its title. See Aplt. Brief at 12-13. However, the exemption statute does not, by its

1

terms, even refer to the heading of Section 401 nor does it purport to incorporate
by reference said heading. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(l)(a)(x) (2000). In
addition, the Trustee's argument ignores the obvious: if the Utah Legislature had
intended to state that a retirement plan can only be exempt if it is actually, and
operationally, "qualified under" Section 401(a) of the IRC, it could have done so.
See Kitches & Zorn, L.L.C. v. Kim, 2005 UT App. 164, % 8, 112 P.3d 1210
(stating that if legislature had intended to use different wc^rd, it could have done
so). Thus, the text does not support the Trustee's strict interpretation of the
exemption statute.
Second, the legislative history does not support thelTrustee's strict
interpretation of the exemption statute. In his opening bri^f, the Trustee quotes
two statements made by legislators, but acknowledges tha[t such statements do not
explain why the Utah Legislature chose to use the words "'described in" instead of
"qualified under." Aplt. Brief at 13. Hence, such statements do not support the
Trustee's strict reading of the exemption statute. In fact, Said statements weigh
against the Trustee's position because they show the legislators were familiar with
the term "qualified," as it relates to retirement plans, yet tjie Utah Legislature chose
not to use that word in the exemption statute.
Furthermore, the legislative comments cited by the iTrustee actually support
the Debtor's position in this case. For example, Senator Ifmlinson stated that the
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purported intent of the exemption statute was to "make our bankruptcy treatment
[of retirement plans] consistent with the federal [taxation]! law." Aplt. Brief at 14
(quoting Senator Finlinson) (emphasis added).
Here, the Trustee's position treats the exemption statute inconsistently with
federal taxation laws: while federal taxation laws would a|low the Debtor to
correct all of the defects in the Plan and retain the Plan's tax benefits (through the
IRS program "Employee Plans Compliance Resolution System" ("EPCRS")), the
Trustee's position completely ignores the availability of EJPCRS to a debtor. Thus,
it is the Debtor's position (not the Trustee's) which is con$istent with the
legislators' statements.1 As a result, the legislative history does not support the
Trustee's strict interpretation of the exemption statute.
Third, and finally, the case of In re Kaplan, 162 B.R. 684, 697 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1993), does not support the Trustee's strict interpretation of the exemption
statute. In his opening brief, the Trustee tries to diminish land twist the actual
holding of In re Kaplan by relying on dicta concerning what may happen " i f the

1

Under the heading of "Legislative History" the Trustee also gives his own
speculative opinion as to why the Utah Legislature did not use the words "qualified
under" but instead the words "described in." See Aplt. Brief at 15-16. As rebutted
by the Debtor before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, see 10 Circuit Aplee.
Brief at 18 n.6, such opining is not "legislative history," was never argued before
the Bankruptcy Court, and is not supported by any legal authority. See id. Thus,
the Trustee's argument should be rejected by this Court.

SLC_620715.1

3

IRS should in the future rule that the plan was not tax-qualified. Aplt. Brief at 1718.
Notably, in Kaplan the IRS had not ruled that the plan was disqualified. See
In re Kaplan, 162 B.R. at 696-97. The same is true in thisl case—at no time has the
IRS ruled or found that the Plan is disqualified. (Aplt. App. at 47,11. 11-13). Thus,
Kaplan squarely supports the Debtor's position because both Kaplan and this case
deal with an exemption statute that does not use the more ispecific phrase "qualified
under," the retirement plan has not been disqualified by the IRS, and all defects are
correctable. As a result, In re Kaplan does not support th$ Trustee's strict
interpretation of the exemption statute.
In summary, then, the Trustee's position in this cas0 is not supported by the
statutory text, legislative history, or the case of In re Kaplftn. Instead, the statutory
text, legislative history, and In re Kaplan support the Debitor's position in this
case—that a retirement plan is exempt where it has not be^n disqualified by the
IRS and all defects are correctable through IRS procedure^. The Debtor's position,
which was adopted by both the Bankruptcy Court and the (District Court, is also
consistent with this Court's historical policy of construing exemption statutes
"liberally . . . in favor of the debtor to protect him and his [family from hardship."
In re Kunz, 2004 UT 71, f 8, 99 P.3d 793. Therefore, thejTrustee's strict view of
the exemption statute should be rejected by this Court.
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II.

THE LOWER COURTS' DECISIONS PROVIDE A CLEAR AND
MEANINGFUL TO STANDARD TO THE EXEMPTION STATUTE
In Part II of his opening brief, the Trustee argues thfct the Bankruptcy Court

did not provide a meaningful standard for the phrase "described in," and then
proceeds to characterize the Debtor has having committee! a series of bad acts as
the administrator of the Plan. See Aplt. Brief at 19-24. As shown below, the facts
in this case provide a meaningful standard for the phrase ^described in": a
retirement plan is "described in" Section 401(a) of the IR$ where it has not been
disqualified by the IRS and all alleged defects are correctable through IRS
procedures.
In an attempt to bolster his argument, and to cast th£ Debtor in a bad light,
the Trustee first places the Debtor in the same category as| parties who omitted
from 5 to over 100 employees from a retirement plan, and| a debtor who included a
non-employee spouse in the retirement plan, made loans tp himself from the plan
in excess of $400,000, and generally used the plan as a "personal piggy bank." See
Aplt. Brief at 20-23 n.22 & 26 (citing Myron v. United Stfttes. 550 F.2d 1145 (9th
Cir. 1977); In re Goldschein, 244 B.R. 595, 601-02 (Bankt. D. Md. 2000); In re
Plunk, 481 F.3d 302 (5th Cir. 2007)). Notably, the foregoing cases are also
distinguishable because the applicable state exemption statutes required the plans
to be "qualified under" the IRC in order to be exempt.
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Next, the Trustee lists up to eight alleged problems (with the Plan, in an
attempt to distort the nature and severity of the alleged Pl^n defects. Contrary to
the Trustee's characterizations of the Plan defects, the Bai]ikruptcy Court found
only four defects in the Plan: (i) one person was omitted f}*om the Plan, the
Debtor's spouse; (ii) a loan of 3% of the Plan's assets, whfcre funds were not
withdrawn from the custodial account and the loan was not made to the Debtor or
his family; (hi) an excess contribution of $1,455.75 in the|year 2000; and (iv) the
failure to allocate contributions to the money purchase pl$n portion of the Plan.
(Aplt.App. at 46,11. 7-22).
As explained in the Debtor's opening brief to this Court, see Debtor's
Opening Brief at 15, the foregoing operational defects arei minor and do not rise to
the level of the parties in the cases cited by the Trustee. And, more importantly, all
of the alleged operational failures in the Plan are correctable through the IRS

Paragraph 2 and footnote 23 on page 21, and footnote 9 on page 7, of the
Trustee's opening brief contain arguments not previously raised on appeal by the
Trustee, and which are not supported by the Bankruptcy Court's findings.
Therefore, such arguments should be ignored by this Couijt.
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program EPCRS. (Aplt. App. at 47,11. 2-4; 228-229). EIpCRS was designed to
allow employers to correct retirement plan defects, thereby avoiding the loss of tax
benefits that otherwise would result from plan disqualification. (Aplt. App. at 204,
11. 14-19; 223,11. 8-17; 227).
Therefore, despite the Trustee's attempts to vilify the Debtor, this case is not
a case in which egregious acts were committed by a debtor to take advantage of his
retirement plan. Instead, this case is representative of conjimon operational failures
that can occur in the administration of a retirement plan. Because the IRS allows
such operational failures to be corrected, it is proper to interpret the Utah
exemption statute as allowing exemptions for retirement plans that have
correctable defects and have not been disqualified by the JRS. Such a standard is

While discussing the subject of EPCRS, the Trustee attempts to distinguish
between "VCP" and "SCP" procedures. See Aplt. Brief at 23. Before the 10th
Circuit Court of Appeals, the Trustee argued that "insignificant" operational
failures may be corrected through Self Correction Procedures ("SCP") while
"significant" operational failures must be corrected through Voluntary Correction
Procedures ("VCP"). However, the Trustee's expert never distinguished the
alleged Plan operational failures as "significant" or "insignificant." In addition, the
Revenue Procedure cited by the Trustee states that both "significant" and
"insignificant" failures may fall under SCP, while the distinguishing characteristic
of VCP is that under VCP the corrections are made with the approval of the IRS.
See Rev. Proc. 2006-27, Part IV, §§ 8 & 9; Part V. AgaiiJ, the key fact to this
analysis is that the Trustee's own expert testified, and the Bankruptcy Court found,
that all of the alleged operational failures in the Plan were| correctable. (Aplt. App.
47,11. 2-4; 228-229).
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meaningful and clear, and upholds the legislative purpose land policies of Utah
exemption statutes.
The same cannot be said for the Trustee's interpretation of the statute, where
even the slightest failure by an employer to correctly operate a retirement plan
would result in debtors losing their exemptions—even if guch failure were
correctable under federal taxation laws. The Trustee's own expert, Mr. Lloyd,
acknowledged that the purpose of EPCRS was to avoid thp harsh results that would
otherwise occur where, for example, a single employee is mot included in a
retirement plan:
As you can imagine, the consequences in a plan that
covers hundreds of thousands of participants and has
hundreds of millions, if not billions of dollars in it, the
consequence that arises, if it turns out that plan forgets,
for example, to include a particular employed in its
facility down in some far away place, and yei, the failure
to include that one employee in the plan is a document is an operational failure.
(Aplt. App. at 226).
Thus, for the Utah exemption statute to be truly consistent with federal
taxation laws, the phrase "described in" should be interpreted as allowing debtors
to exempt retirement plans where the alleged plan defects! are correctable through
IRS procedures and the plan has not been disqualified by the IRS. Such a
construction is supported by the statutory text, legislative [history, and this Court's
historical policy of construing exemption statutes "liberally . . . in favor of the
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debtor to protect him and his family from hardship." Inre|Kunz, 2004 UT 71, f 8,
99P.3d793.
CONCLUSION
As set forth above, this Court should reject the Trustee's strict interpretation
of Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(l)(a)(x) (2000). Instead, this Court should liberally
construe the exemption statute, and keep it consistent with federal taxation laws,
by holding that a Keogh plan can be "described in" section 401(a) of the IRC—and
is therefore exempt under Utah law—despite failing to fulfill that section's
requirements for qualification, where the qualification failures are correctable
through IRS procedures.
DATED this 8th day of June, 2010.
Duane H. Gillman
Michael F. Thomson
Jessica G. Peterson
Durham Jones & Pinegar
Attorneys for Appellee

SLC_620715.1

9

""^

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing REPLY
BRIEF OF APPELLEE was served this 8th day of June,| 2010, via searchable
PDF on CD and via regular U.S. mail, postage prepaid uppn the following:
James A. Boevers
Adam S. Affleck
Erin M. Stone
Prince Yeates & Geldzahler
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

/

s/<000*^?ft?~

Duane H. Gillman
Michael F. Thomson
Jessica G. Peterson
Durham Jones & Pmegar
Attorneys for Appellee

SLC 620715.1

10

